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ABSTRACT 
Investment in human capital, especially in children’s education, is considered to be among the 
most effective ways for countries to improve their national welfare and reduce poverty in the long 
term. The Government of Indonesia has promoted human capital investment, especially in children, by 
designing school subsidy programs. Since 2005, the school operational assistance program (BOS) has 
been the biggest school subsidy program in Indonesia during the last two decades. This paper 
evaluates the impact of BOS on children’s test scores at the early stage. This study uses Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) to estimate the average treatment effect, in the absence of selection, on 
unobserved characteristics. The results confirm that BOS can increase student performance. The 
finding suggests that the Government of Indonesia needs to develop a subsidy program to provide a 
basic level of education for all students, especially for the poor, as the recent school subsidy program 
is only sufficient for school fees or even only enough for tuition fees if the students live in urban areas. 
The remainder of the education expenditures must be covered by the household. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Investment in human capital, especially in 
children’s education, is considered to be among 
the most effective ways for countries to improve 
their national welfare and reduce poverty in the 
long term. Becker (1964) pointed out that 
investment in human capital raises earnings in 
later life. Undoubtedly, promoting educational 
attainment can raise living standards on average 
and contribute to a reduction in absolute poverty 
by enabling individuals to generate income and 
access better-paid jobs. Many governments in 
developing countries have made this one of their 
top national priorities by ensuring that the 
national budget allocation for education is 
increased. Many governments have promoted 
human capital investment, especially in children, 
by designing subsidy programs such as 
PROGRESA (Programa de Educación, Salud y 
Alimentación) in Mexico, PRAF (Programa de 
Asignación Familiar) in Honduras, PETI 
(Programa de Erradicaçao do Trabalho Infantil) 
in Brazil, FA (Familias en Acción) in Colombia, 
and BOS (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah) in 
Indonesia. BOS started in 2005 and has been the 
biggest school subsidy program in Indonesia 
during the last two decades. An important issue 
addressed in this paper is the evaluation of the 
impact of BOS on student performance at 
primary school, especially in improving the 
quality of education as measured by children’s 
test scores.  
This paper contributes to the international 
literature in several aspects. First, compared to 
other literature such as Attanasio et al., 2005); 
(Behrman & Todd, 1999); (Dearden & Heath, 
1996); (Dearden et al., 2005); and (Glewwe & 
Olinto 2004), this study uses survey data with 
self-reported information on whether children 
get a school subsidy from the government. This 
allows us to estimate the impact of the treatment 
rather than the intention to treat (people 
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eligibility). Second, this study examines the 
impact of school subsidies on a measure of 
school quality, test scores, while most of the 
earlier studies looked at the I mpact of school 
subsidies on a quantity measure of schooling, 
such as school enrolment or dropping out. Third, 
the BOS program is an example of a specific 
school subsidy program to support basic 
education in Indonesia. The subsidy for each 
student who is eligible is distributed to the 
school directly and is managed by the school for 
operational expenses so that the students will be 
free from all kinds of fees during their schooling. 
The students only receive a small amount of 
money for their transportation allowance. An 
evaluation of this school subsidy policy is 
important to discover whether this kind of policy 
is appropriate for adoption in other countries.  
According to the World Bank, Indonesia has 
a relatively low percentage, at 3 percent, of GDP 
allocated to education, or about 13 percent of 
public expenditure. It is relatively low if 
compared with developed countries such as 
Denmark, which has the highest percentage of 
public spending on education at 8 percent of 
GDP, or around 30% of public expenditure. 
Moreover, based on the poverty line definition 
used by the Central Bureau of Statistics of IDR 
182,636 or US$20 per person per month, 
Indonesia - with a population of 235 million - 
still had approximately 30 million people, or 
around 13 per cent , living in poverty in 2010. 
However, according to the World Bank’s 
poverty definition of US$2 per person per day, 
Indonesia has 116 million people (49 percent) 
who live in poverty. The Government of 
Indonesia realizes that such extreme poverty 
implies that income is usually only just sufficient 
for subsistence and not sufficient to finance 
schooling; therefore the government has to 
consider its policies regarding financing 
education.  
As a part of financing education, the 
Government of Indonesia has designed several 
school subsidy programs in the last two decades 
especially to support basic education, such as the 
JPS (Jaring Pengaman Sosial) scholarship 
program, the BKM (Bantuan Khusus Murid) 
program, and the BOS (Bantuan Operasional 
Sekolah) program. The BOS program is the most 
recent school subsidy program with the biggest 
allocation of national budget. The main purpose 
of the BOS program is to support nine years of 
basic education in Indonesia so that all poor 
children can get access to basic education free of 
charge. In 2005, when BOS was launched, it was 
only allocated to poor students who met certain 
criteria, so those children were entitled to get 
free education. In 2009, BOS was allocated to 
each school based on the total number of 
students, so all students at primary and junior 
high school were free from school fees, although 
well-off students still paid some school opera-
tional costs, such as for extracurricular, enrich-
ment or other student activities.  
This study uses Propensity Score Matching 
(PSM) to estimate the average treatment effect, 
in the absence of selection, on unobserved 
characteristics. The main finding is that the BOS 
program has a positive and significant effect on 
child test scores. Students who receive subsidies 
on average raise their test score. It suggests that 
the BOS program in Indonesia has increased test 
scores by 0.26 points. In the early days of the 
program, BOS successfully improved average 
student performance.  
This paper is organized as follows. The next 
section discusses a review of the literature on the 
effects of school subsidies on schooling. The 
third section outlines the school subsidy reforms 
in Indonesia and is followed by descriptions of 
the students and BOS. The fifth section presents 
data sources and is followed by methodology. 
The seventh section discusses the finding on 
child test scores and evaluates the estimation 
results. The last section concludes with policy 
recommendations. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section reviews the previous school 
subsidy studies using micro data. Many coun-
tries use conditional cash transfers (CCT) as the 
type of subsidy. CCT is a type of subsidy by 
giving money to the poor in return for fulfilling 
specific behavioural conditions. The conditions 
are made to minimize the failures in terms of the 
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aim of subsidy while transferring money to the 
poor. Janvry and Sadaulet (2006) underlined that 
CCT can assist the use of subsidy to be more 
efficient if implemented using three rules. The 
first is a rule to select the poor. The second is 
eligibility among the poor and the last one is 
calibration of transfers, particularly if budgets 
are insufficient to offer large universal transfers 
to all the poor. Conditionality is used to try to 
ensure that the subsidy has the desired effect 
such as in increasing school enrolment, 
decreasing school dropout rate, or increasing 
student performance. In addition to the type of 
subsidy, the methods that the previous studies 
used are also varied. Some studies use randomiz-
ed experiments, and other studies implement 
different methods, such as instrumental variable 
regression, propensity score matching, or linear 
parametric regression. The literature is reviewed 
separately for developed and developing 
countries.  
1.  Developed Country Studies 
A considerable number of studies have 
focused their attention on school subsidies in 
developed countries. The US study for New 
York City (NYC), was conducted by Riccio et 
al. (2010). The program, known as Opportunity 
NYC, is a conditional cash transfer program for 
poor families. The recipients should use the 
subsidy for developing their children’s education 
or other activities related with developing human 
capital. The finding showed that there was no 
effect on some educational outcomes, such as 
educational achievement, for primary and secon-
dary school students.  
In the United Kingdom, Dearden et al. 
(2005) examined the effect of conditional cash 
transfer paid to children aged 16-18 in full-time 
education on school dropouts in the UK in 1999. 
The Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA) 
program was targeted at students who completed 
the last year of compulsory education in Year 11 
in summer 1999. This program was introduced 
to subsidize children to remain in school for up 
to two years beyond the statutory age in the UK 
(Dearden et al., 2005). By using Kernel-based 
propensity score matching, a multinomial probit 
and a linear regression model, they estimated the 
impact of the program on school dropouts. 
Dearden et al. (2005) confirmed that EMA had a 
positive and significant impact on school 
participation.  
In 1986, the government of Australia intro-
duced the school subsidy program, AUSTUDY, 
to increase school participation in higher 
education and reduce youth unemployment. 
Dearden and Heath (1999) estimated the impact 
of AUSTUDY on the probability of completing 
the final two years of secondary school. They 
used instrumental variables, where the eligibility 
for AUSTUDY was used as an instrument for 
AUSTUDY receipt. They found that the 
AUSTUDY program had been successful in 
increasing school participation by approximately 
3 percent, especially for those who were from 
poor family backgrounds.  
2. Developing Country Studies 
The most influential study of school subsidy 
program in developing countries was the study 
on the Mexican PROGRESA poverty program 
by Behrman and Todd (1999). PROGRESA was 
created in 1997 to provide a conditional cash 
grant and to support education, health and 
nutrition for rural poor families in Mexico, 
especially for children and their mothers. In the 
case of educational grants, the recipients had to 
meet some requirements that were designed by 
the Federal government, such as maintaining 
school attendance for children at 85 percent and 
above. Behrman and Todd (1999) tried to 
evaluate the impact of PROGRESA on edu-
cation for poor families in the initial stages by 
using a randomized social experiment. This 
approach was used to ensure the similarity of 
both observable and unobservable characteristics 
between the treatment and control areas. 
Treatment was randomly assigned at the local 
level, not at the household level to ensure that 
the control was not contaminated. In general 
they found that there was no difference between 
treatment and control area means.  
Using the same data that was used by 
Behrman and Todd (1999), Schultz (2004) re-
examined the effect of the PROGRESA school 
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subsidy on school enrolment in Mexico. He also 
used a randomized design to analyse the data 
and this was followed by a two step analysis. 
Firstly, he used difference-in-differences bet-
ween the treatment and control groups to see the 
impact of subsidy on school enrolment. Second-
ly, a probit model was adopted to estimate the 
effect on the probability of being enrolled in 
school. The determinants of school enrolment 
include the household characteristics, such as the 
years of schooling completed by father and 
mother, the eligibility of children (from the poor 
family), the residential area where the 
PROGRESA was implemented, the distance to 
the nearest school and the school and community 
characteristics. Schultz found that there was a 
significant difference in school enrolment 
between the areas where PROGRESA was 
implemented and where it was not.  
Nicaragua created a similar conditional cash 
transfer program in 2000, Red de Proteccion 
Social (RPS), modelled on the PROGRESA 
conditional cash transfer program. This program 
was targeted at poor households and conditioned 
the cash transfer on school attendance and health 
service. Maluccio and Flores (2005) conducted 
an evaluation of that area level using the 
evaluation design based on a randomized, 
community-based intervention with measure-
ments before and after the intervention in both 
treatment and control communities. They ran-
domly selected 42 administrative areas for the 
program. Each administrative area had around 
100 households. Twenty one areas were for 
treatment areas and 21 areas were for control 
areas. They found that RPS successfully 
increased the net school enrolment by 12.8 
percent on average and decreased the number of 
working children by 5.6 percent.  
Honduras is another country with a cash 
transfer program similar to Mexico, Ecuador and 
Nicaragua. Glewwe and Olinto (2004) evaluated 
the impact of the conditional cash transfer 
program (Program de Asignacion Familiar, 
PRAF) on schooling. They used demand and 
supply side methods to examine the program. 
The demand side was the approach when the 
household received the cash transfer conditional 
on school attendance of the children while the 
supply side was the approach when the assis-
tance goes to the school directly. Glewwe and 
Olinto (2004) confirmed that the demand side 
approach is more effective than the supply side, 
increasing the school enrolment by 1-2 percent 
and reducing the drop-out rate by 2-3 percent. 
In a more recent study in Ecuador, another 
developing country in Latin America, Schady 
and Araujo (2008) examined the impact of 
conditional cash transfers on school enrolment. 
The cash transfer program, the Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano (BDH), was a huge program 
from 2004 with a total budget of approximately 
0.7 percent of the Gross Domestic Product of 
Ecuador and was targeted at poor families with 
children aged 6-17. It was evaluated using a 
reduced form regression, where the dependent 
variable was a dummy variable of school enrol-
ment as a function of child and household 
characteristics and dummy variable of BDH that 
takes value 1 if the household received the cash 
transfer. They found that the probability that the 
child was enrolled in school increased by 3.2 
percent to 4 percent when the household 
received the cash transfer. 
Attanasio, Fitzsimons and Gomez (2005), in 
a study of the impact of the conditional cash 
programme in Colombia, Familias en Action 
(FA), on school enrolment, found that a monthly 
subsidy for education paid to eligible mothers 
whose children attended school was an effective 
programme to increase school enrolment, both in 
urban and rural areas. They used average infor-
mation of the school enrolment in the treatment 
group either with or without program and the 
control group then estimated the counterfactual 
for the treatment group without the programme. 
Estimation was by linear regression because of 
its greater efficiency. They confirmed that the 
program increased school enrolment both in 
urban and rural areas. 
Pakistan has a further example of a school 
subsidy programme in a developing country. In 
this case, the transfer is made to the school. Kim, 
Alderman and Orazem (1999) studied the impact 
of this school subsidy, the Urban Fellowship 
Program, on school enrolment, particularly for 
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poor girls. This study observed that in Pakistan 
there are cultural reasons which prevent girls 
from going to school. To overcome this problem, 
the government of Pakistan introduced private 
schools for girls to increase girls’ enrolment, 
especially in poor regions. These private schools 
are supported by the government and receive 
school subsidies which are allocated to the poor 
girls’ tuition fees. They define the treatment 
group as the households which reside in the 
region where a girls’ private school is created, 
while the control group is the households which 
reside outside the program’s region. They found 
that the girls’ school subsidy can increase the 
enrolment rate, not only for girls but also for 
boys. This result suggests that girls’ education is 
complementary with boys’ education. 
India provides subsidies for school meals. 
Afridi (2010) evaluated the impact of school 
meals on school participation in rural India. This 
study used school panel data and household data 
which was estimated by difference-in-diffe-
rences. Afridi (2010) estimated two different 
models. The first model was for both public and 
private schools while the second was only for 
public schools. All models confirmed that there 
was a negative and insignificant effect of school 
meals subsidy on school enrolment. Further-
more, the school meals subsidy program had a 
significant impact on the daily attendance 
decisions. There was a larger and significant 
increase in girls’ attendance in the lower grades, 
but an insignificant effect for boys in lower 
grades. This was because the cash value of the 
school meals subsidy was relatively larger for 
lower grade students, and encouraged the parents 
to send their children to school more regularly, 
especially girls in lower grades. As a result, this 
program was found to reduce gender disparity in 
education.  
There have been some empirical studies on 
Indonesian subsidies in lower grades. The most 
famous study was conducted by Duflo (2001), 
which examined a school subsidy by Indonesia’s 
government for the school construction pro-
gramme. Between 1973/1974 and 1978/1979, 
61,807 new schools were constructed and it 
spent over USD 500 million, calculated using 
the 1990 exchange rate. The World Bank (1990) 
observed that it was the fastest primary school 
construction program ever undertaken in the 
world. The research suggested that an invest-
ment in infrastructure causes a rise in school 
enrolment and educational attainment. An 
increase in educational attainment caused an 
increase in earnings. Another school subsidy 
study was conducted by Sparrow (2007). He 
evaluated the impact of the social safety net in 
education (Jaring Pengaman Sosial, JPS) on 
school enrolment after Indonesia was hit by the 
financial crisis in 1997/1998. Using instrumental 
variable regression, he confirmed that the JPS 
program was an effective policy for protecting 
the education of the poor, especially for those 
who were most vulnerable to the effects of the 
crisis. This program was found to increase 
school attendance by 1.2percent for children 
aged 10-12 and 1.8percent for children aged 13-
15.  
Table 1 shows the impact of school subsidy 
in various countries as a percentage of a standard 
deviation in the dependent variable. It shows the 
estimated effect of school subsidies on enrol-
ment rate, dropout rate or test score in various 
selected countries. The highest impact of the 
program was found in Pakistan, where the 
school subsidy program was estimated increase 
the outcome by 68 percent of SD while the US 
gave the lowest impact of only 1.87 percent of 
SD. Compared to other studies, the effect of 
school subsidy on student performance in this 
paper is quite large at 21.3 percent.  
SCHOOL SUBSIDY POLICIES REFORM 
IN INDONESIA 
This section outlines the school subsidy 
programs in Indonesia since 1970. The Govern-
ment of Indonesia has paid more attention to 
education since Independence Day in 1945 by 
making education one of the national consti-
tution’s objectives. For a country whose popu-
lation structure has a huge proportion of young 
people, the most important national concern in 
education is how to provide basic education. In 
1994, the basic education policy changed from a 
focus on children aged 6-12 in the old policy to a 
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new focus on children aged 6-15, especially 
from poor families. Based on the population 
survey in 2005, the number of children of school 
age is approximately 20 percent, out of 235 
million people.  
In the President Soeharto era, a huge amount 
of money was allocated to the primary school 
construction project, the program that was 
named the SD Inpres Project. More than 61,000 
primary schools were constructed between 
1973/1974 and 1978/1979 throughout the coun-
try and according to Duflo (2001), the budget 
was over USD 500 million at 1990 exchange 
rates. The whole budget was funded by the oil 
boom revenue from 1973 to 1980. Based on the 
Presidential instruction, each school was given a 
target to enrol approximately 120 students with 3 
teachers, and the local governments and society 
had a responsibility to provide additional school 
subsidies if there was insufficient funding for 
implementation.  
In 1998, after Indonesia was hit by the Asian 
economic crisis, the school subsidy began to be 
used as an important policy. At this time, the 
school subsidy was a part of the social safety net 
program, which was known as the JPS (Jaring 
Pengaman Sosial) program. JPS was very useful 
in assisting the families who suffered from the 
crisis, especially in supporting education expen-
diture. JPS in education was allocated to two 
types of school subsidies: scholarships for 
students and block grants for schools. Scholar-
ships were distributed to the students directly 
while block grants were distributed to the 
schools. Sparrow (2006) pointed out that the JPS 
program appeared to fully support poor families 
in supporting household expenditure while the 
block grant, Dana Bantuan Operasional (DBO), 
was intended to keep the school operating during 
the crisis. Both subsidies were distributed as 
cash transfers to the students and schools.  
The JPS subsidy covered 6 percent of stu-
dents in primary school, 17 percent of students 
in junior high school and 10 percent in senior 
high school, and the amount of money per 
student per annum was IDR 120,000 or equi-
valent to $12 for primary school, IDR 240,000 
($24) for junior high school and IDR 300,000 
($30) for senior high school. The students who 
were eligible to get the scholarships were: (1) 
students from poor families; (2) students at 
grades 4, 5 and 6 for primary school and all 
levels for junior and senior high schools; (3) 
dropped-out students or students vulnerable to 
dropping out for economic reasons. The govern-
ment used data from the National Family 
Planning Coordinating Agency (Badan Koor-
dinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional, BKKBN) 
for selecting the students who were eligible to 
get subsidies. According to BKKBN standards, 
there are five categories of family prosperity 
level: Pre-prosperous Families, Prosperous I, 
Prosperous II, Prosperous III and Prosperous III 
Plus. The school subsidies were distributed to 
the two lowest BKKBN household levels (Pre-
Prosperous and Prosperous I). All the funds for 
the 5-year program (1998-2003) were from the 
Government of Indonesia, the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank.  
In 2001, the Government of Indonesia 
decided to reduce the fuel subsidy and allocated 
the funds to education, health and infrastructure 
instead. The purpose of distributing the funds to 
these three sectors was: to accelerate the 9-year 
compulsory basic education program; to secure 
health services for the poor; and to develop 
village infrastructures, particularly for remote 
and poor villages. With respect to the education 
goal, the Government of Indonesia used the 
funds to add more scholarships for poor students 
and block grants for the schools. This school 
subsidy, which was known as Special Assistance 
for Students (Bantuan Khusus Murid, BKM), 
was distributed to the students as a cash transfer 
and covered 20 percent of all students in primary 
school, junior high school and senior high 
school. Expenditure was the same as the JPS 
scholarship program while the block grants for 
the school, which were known as Special Assis-
tance to School (Bantuan Khusus Sekolah, 
BKS), were bigger than DBO in the JPS pro-
gram. The BKM and BKS programs lasted 4 
years, from 2001 to 2004. 
In July 2005, The BKM and BKS were 
superceded by the School Operational Assis-
tance Program (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah, 
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BOS). This program was still part of the Fuel 
Subsidy Compensation Program but the concept 
of BOS was slightly different from the previous 
subsidy programs. BOS was designed to support 
poor students with free access to basic education 
and to reduce the financial burdens on the rest of 
the students. In 2005, all poor students had 
priority to receive BOS so that they could go to 
school without paying any fees, while wealthier 
students still had to pay some fees but not as 
much as if there were no BOS program. The idea 
of the BOS program, as its name (School 
Operational Assistance) suggests, was to support 
each school in financing their operational costs, 
such as textbook procurement, school exams, 
general and daily tests, consumables procure-
ment (notebooks, chalk, pencils, lab materials, 
etc.), stationery, maintenance costs, electricity 
and telephone costs, student activities costs 
(remedial, extracurricular). Thus, for financing 
the operational costs, each school received funds 
from the government and some wealthier 
students, still had to pay some fees. The amounts 
of the subsidies were IDR 235,000 per student 
per annum for primary school and IDR 325,000 
for junior high school. The subsidies were 
distributed every 3 months (January-March, 
April-June, July-September and October-
December).  
In 2009, the BOS policy was changed. BOS 
was now allocated for all students (poor and rich 
students) who were registered at primary and 
secondary schools. To simplify the distribution, 
BOS was sent to schools directly and distributed 
to each school based on the total number of 
students. Thus, the main purpose of the BOS 
program 2009 was to ensure that all school-age 
children could go to school without paying any 
school operational costs and this was the 
difference between the BOS program 2009 and 
the BOS program 2005. In addition, for the BOS 
program 2009, poor students got an additional 
assistance for transportation and a uniform 
allowance. Moreover, in 2009, the government 
changed the objective of the BOS program. The 
previous goal was only to accelerate the 9-year 
basic education programme and a new goal was 
added - to increase the quality of basic 
education. The amount of money was also 
increased to IDR 400,000 per student per annum 
for primary schools and IDR 575,000 for junior 
high schools per annum.  
The poor students got free access to basic 
education and were also eligible to receive the 
transport and uniform allowances. This was 
determined by the school committee and their 
poor status had to be proved by a letter from the 
village head. The school committee consisted of 
the teachers, school principal and same parents 
or guardians of the students. To guarantee that 
the poor students could go to school without 
paying any cost, both in public and private 
schools, the central government set up moni-
toring teams which consisted of representatives 
of central, provincial and local government to 
control the implementation of the BOS program.  
Table 2 shows a summary of the amount of 
assistance for each school subsidy program in 
Indonesia for basic education after the primary 
school construction project in the 1970s (SD 
Inpres program), from 1998 until now. There are 
three big programs which support basic edu-
cation system in Indonesia. All of them have the 
goal of increasing net enrolment in primary and 
junior high school.  
Even though the nominal value of BKM 
scholarships per student per annum is the same 
as the JPS scholarship, the real value is lower 
than the previous program. For instance, the real 
value of the JPS scholarship program for 
primary school students per student per annum 
in 2007 rupiah was IDR 240,712 while the BKM 
scholarship program per student per annum was 
IDR 191,748. On the other hand, for the first 
BOS program in 2005-2009 the real value of the 
scholarship is a little higher than the previous 
ones, but it increased significantly after 2009. 
Besides all the assistance for the students, there 
are block grants for schools in the JPS and BKM 
programs, but not for the BOS program, since 
the BOS funds were given to the schools based 
on the number of students in each school for all 
operational expenses. 
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PROFILE OF STUDENTS AND BOS AT 
BASIC EDUCATION IN INDONESIA 
The 9 year basic education goes from 
primary school to junior high school and these 
levels of schooling are a compulsory part of the 
structure of education in Indonesia. There are 6 
main levels of schooling, from play group to 
university. First, play group is normally for 
children aged between 3-4 years. Second, 
kindergarten is usually for children aged 
between 5-6 years. Neither of these first two 
levels of schooling is compulsory. Third, 
primary school is a 6-year basic education. 
Fourth, junior high school is a 3-year basic 
education. Both primary school and junior high 
school are compulsory and are known as 9-year 
basic education for children aged 7 to 15 years. 
Fifth, senior high school is three years of 
schooling after 9-year basic education and is not 
compulsory. Lastly, higher education is from 
undergraduate to post graduate programs. 
The main goal of the 9-year basic education 
program and the BOS program is, therefore, to 
ensure that all Indonesian citizens attain the 
junior high school level free of charge. 
Currently, the net enrolment rate of junior high 
school in Indonesia is approximately 70 percent. 
By implementing the BOS program, the 
Goverment of Indonesia has set a target to 
achieve approximately 100 percent of junior 
high school gross enrolment rate or approxi-
mately 80 percent for the net enrolment rate1. 
																																								 																				
1  Gross enrolment rate is calculated from the total 
number of students at primary school and also 
students at non-formal education equal to primary 
school level (could be elderly who enrol in non-
formal education equal to primary school level) 
divided by the total number of people in that age of 
schooling and multiplied by 100 percent.  
Net enrolment rate is calculated from the total 
number of students at primary school age (only 
those who enrol in formal education at primary 
school) divided by the total number of people in 
that age of schooling and multiplied by 100 percent.  
Gross enrolment rate could be more than 100 
percent because there are students who are outside 
the official school age, for instance 25-year-olds 
who went to primary school. The same way is used 
to calculate the junior high school gross and net 
enrolment rates.  
Figure 1 represents the net enrolment rate in 
each level of education from 2000 to 2009.  
The figure shows that the highest net 
enrolment rate in Indonesia in 2009 is primary 
school at around 95 percent, followed by junior 
high school at approximately 70 percent. The net 
enrolment rate of senior high school is around 45 
percent and the lowest one is university 
enrolment rate, which is approximately 10 
percent. The figure shows a significant increase 
in the net enrolment rate at junior high school 
and senior high school level in Indonesia from 
2000 to 2009 but only a slight increase for 
primary school and higher education net enrol-
ment rate. 
To achieve the net enrolment target, the 
Government of Indonesia has increased the 
number of junior high schools significantly. 
Figure 2 demonstrates the number of schools at 
primary school and junior high school levels 
from 2001 to 2010. There has been a significant 
rise in the number of junior high schools, both 
public and private, and a slight decrease in the 
number of primary schools in Indonesia from 
2000 to 2010.  
There are approximately 140,000 primary 
public schools, which is a lot compared to 
private schools, which number only around 
10,000. The number of schools decreased 
slightly for both public and private during this 
period. On the other hand, the number of junior 
high schools increased gradually, especially the 
public schools. In 2001 the number of public and 
private schools were similar with around 10,000 
schools, but by the end of 2010 the number of 
public schools had risen significantly to 
approximately 18.000 schools, while the number 
of private schools increased slowly to 12,000 
schools (see figure 2). 
In addition, the trend in the number of 
students at primary schools shows a slight 
increase while the trend in the number at 
primary schools shows a small decrease during 
the last 10 years, both in public and private 
schools. According to the education data base 
from the directorate general for basic education 
in Indonesia, all students could be enrolled in 
primary schools by increasing the number of 
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classrooms and classes in existing primary 
schools. For example, nationally in 2007 the 
number of classes was 974,412 and the number 
of classrooms was 891,594, then in 2009 the 
number of classes was increased to 1,009,232 
and the number of classrooms was 899,016. 
However, the trend in the number of junior high 
school students has shown a significant increase 
since 2005, especially for public schools (figure 
3). This reflects the government’s commitment 
to provide a 9-year basic education.  
Based on the previous evidence, the govern-
ment of Indonesia has made a significant effort 
to improve resources and to increase the net 
enrolment rate at every level of education. By 
implementing the BOS program, the government 
signalled its intention to increase the net 
enrolment rate, particularly for basic education. 
As can be seen in Figure 4, according to the 
latest population census in 2010, the BOS 
program still does not cover all children at the 
primary school level. The ratio of the total 
number of BOS students to the total number of 
children at the primary school level for all 
regions in Indonesia is below 90 percent, except 
in West Papua. This is because West Papua has 
less children of school age than other provinces. 
In addition, regions with higher numbers of 
children of school age seem to have a lower 
enrolment, such as East Java, West Java and 
Central Java. In fact, there are still many 
children at the primary school level who do not 
receive BOS as their financial support to provide 
free access to basic education. These children 
are not registered at primary school level. It 
could be because they are categorised as street 
children, helping their parents to earn money, or 
their parents are not keen to encourage their 
children to go to school because they live in 
remote areas.  
DATA SOURCES 
The main source of the micro data used in 
this research is the Indonesia Family Life Survey 
(IFLS). In particular, this paper uses data from 
IFLS4 (2007). This study also uses school 
subsidies data from the Ministry of Education 
and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia 
(MOEC) and other data from the Central Bureau 
of Statistics of Indonesia (BPS) such as: Net 
Enrolment Rate on Each Level of Schooling; 
Number of Schools for Primary and Junior High 
School Levels; and Number of Primary and 
Junior High School Students. IFLS provides 
educational information at individual, household 
and community levels. MOEC provides infor-
mation about school subsidies at the aggregate 
level, and some demographic information comes 
from BPS. 
1. BOS Data 
This study only estimates the early version 
of BOS since it was launched in 2005 to enable 
poor students to have free access to basic 
education and this study uses IFLS survey data 
from 2007. This study determined BOS students 
based on self-reported information and generated 
BOS as a dummy variable equal to 1 if students 
reported that they received BOS and 0 other-
wise. Table 3 shows BOS participation rate at 
primary school and junior high school based on 
IFLS survey data 2007. The percentage of 
students who receive BOS in each grade is 
below 20 percent at primary school and below 
15 percent at junior high school. 
The number of students who receive BOS is 
lower than the government’s expectation and the 
data suggest that BOS is failing to support all 
students for all nine years of basic education. In 
comparison, a study by SMERU in selected 
regions in 2006 found that there were only a few 
poor students who received BOS from the total 
number of poor students in the study regions. 
Table 4 shows the number of poor students who 
received BOS from the school samples. 
The proportion of BOS students in IFLS 
survey data is larger than in the SMERU study. 
That has occurred because IFLS data were 
collected in 2007 while the SMERU base was in 
2005 when BOS was new. In more recent years, 
the allocation of the national budget for BOS has 
been larger, so BOS is expected to cover more 
children or even all children of school age. 
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2. Student Test Score 
Test scores are obtained from the tests in 
primary school at age 11 or in children’s final 
year of primary school. All questions in the test 
are multiple choice and are marked using 
computers. The test is conducted nationally by 
MOEC at the same time and standard for all 
regions in Indonesia. The test is conducted in 
each primary school and monitored by other 
teachers from different schools, and the results 
of the test are announced a month later.  
The test score is continuous variable and 
ranges from 0 to 10. It is calculated from the 
average scores of 3 subjects (Maths, Science and 
Indonesian Language). Test score data from the 
IFLS surveys are taken only from the respon-
dents who could show test certificates and 
excludes the respondents who could not show 
certificates, since sometimes the information is 
not complete. For instance, they only mentioned 
2 subjects out of 3 or they only mentioned the 
total score without mentioning each of the 
subjects individually, because they did not 
remember their scores in detail. Figure 9 
presents the child test score distributions for 
BOS and non-BOS students.  
Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics of 
test scores from BOS students and non-BOS 
students. BOS students have higher average test 
scores than non BOS students.  
In addition, this study also performed t-test 
to test whether there were significantly different 
test scores between BOS and Non-BOS students. 
A t-statistic of -3.76 and a p-value 0.0002, 
implies that the mean scores are statistically 
different from each other at the 1 percent 
significant level.  
Table 7 describes the distribution of stu-
dents’ test score by level of education of the 
father and mother. In general, the higher the 
level of education of the father and mother the 
higher the test scores of the student. More than 
half of students’ test scores below 6.5 out of 10 
are from students whose parental backgrounds 
are not higher than junior high school. The 
highest test scores are found for students whose 
father’s education is at doctoral level.  
3. Education Expenditure 
Apart from school fees (such as registration 
fees, tuition fees and exam fees), there are also 
other education costs incurred during schooling, 
for instance: textbooks cost, uniform cost, 
transportation cost, housing and food cost, and 
any additional courses which students take 
outside school. Table 8 describes the various 
costs of students in primary school and junior 
high school per year.  
The data is taken from IFLS survey data 
2007. The average of registration fees in rural 
areaa are IDR 58,250 per year while in urban 
areas it is IDR 234,369, which is almost four 
times the registration fees from rural areas. 
These registration fees are only paid once during 
their schooling in primary school and are set by 
the school committee (school teachers, school 
principal and student’s parent representative), 
and under the control of local government. The 
average of the tuition fees in rural areas is IDR 
83,800 per year and for exam fees it is IDR 
16,833, while in urban areas the tuition fees are 
over three times the tuition fees in rural areas 
and for exam fees it is IDR 40,262. Other costs 
which are excluded from the school fees and are 
very significant expenses for each student are 
transportation costs, housing costs and food for 
students who live far away from their schools. 
These students need to rent a boarding house and 
spend some money for their own food. The 
housing costs and food costs are usually incurred 
for students at junior high school. If it compares 
the total school expenses to the amount of school 
subsidy which was shown in Table 2, the school 
subsidy is only sufficient for school fees or even 
only enough for tuition fees if the students live 
in urban areas. The remainder of the education 
expenditures must be covered by the household. 
That is why there are still some children of 
school age who cannot afford even basic 
schooling.  
4. Parental Education Background 
Table 9 presents parental education back-
ground of both fathers and mothers of BOS 
students and non-BOS students in 2007. Most 
parents only have a primary school education. 
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However, the proportion of parents with only 
primary education is higher for BOS students 
than non-BOS students. The higher the edu-
cation level, the smaller the proportion of fathers 
and mothers. In general, however, the parents of 
non-BOS students are slightly more educated 
than BOS students. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: 
PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING 
ESTIMATION 
This study used matching method to get the 
estimation result from the average treatment 
effect in the absence of selection based on 
unobserved characteristics. Although random-
ized evaluation is still a perfect impact evalua-
tion method, sometimes a treatment cannot be 
randomized, so the best try is used a mimic 
randomization. It is an observational analogue of 
a randomized experiment. Matching methods try 
to develop a counterfactual or control group that 
is similar to the treatment group given of 
observed characteristics. 
According to Blundell et al. (2005), the 
matching method is defined as a non-parametric 
approach that attempts to find a comparison 
group from all the non-treated so that the 
selected group is similar to the treatment group 
in term of their observable characteristics. The 
only remaining difference between two groups is 
participation in BOS program, therefore, the 
outcomes from the comparison group is the right 
sample for the missing information on the 
outcomes of the treatment group. Propensity 
Score Matching (PSM) estimation method is 
adopted when there is a wide range of matching 
variables. The World Bank argues that PSM is a 
useful approach when we believe that an 
observed characteristics affect program partici-
pation and is sufficiently strong to determine 
program participation. 
According to Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983), 
propensity score is a feasible method to match 
the variables by using balancing score. Blundell, 
Dearden & Sianesi (2005) said that, by defi-
nition, propensity score matching is when 
treatment and non-treatment observations with 
the same value of propensity score have the 
same distribution of density scores. Hence, PSM 
match treated and untreated observations on the 
estimated probability of being treated (propen-
sity score). 
This paper uses PSM to estimate the average 
treatment effect in the absence of selection on 
unobserved characteristics. PSM requires 
selection on observables assumption when 
conditioned on an appropriate set of observable 
attributes. Obviously, there is variability in 
selections that influences the selection process 
for the treatment group and the control group. 
The treatment group is recipients of school 
subsidies who meet poor criteria. Only poor 
students and those who meet poor criteria that 
are prepared by the Central Bureau of Statistics 
will be categorized into the treatment group as 
recipients of BOS (BOS-students). To prove 
whether the students are poor enough, students 
should show a letter from the village head to the 
school committee. For those who can prove 
themselves as poor, they will receive a treat-
ment.  
In non-experimental studies, the essential 
problem is the missing counterfactual. PSM uses 
information from other students that do not get 
BOS (Non-BOS students) as a control group to 
identify what would have happened to students 
in the absence of the intervention (BOS). By 
comparing the outcomes from BOS students 
relative to observationally similar groups (non-
BOS students), it is possible to estimate the 
effects of the intervention.  
The PSM Model  
Following Caliendo and Kopeinig(2005) and 
Sianesi (2006), the core model will consist of 
treatment outcome and control outcome of 
individuals. An observed outcome of individual i 
can be expressed as:  𝑌" = 	𝐷"𝑌&"	 + 1	 − 	𝐷" 𝑌*"																											(1) 
In the above equation, Di ∈ 0,1 	is treat-
ment indicator. 𝐷"	 is equal to one if the indi-
vidual i receives BOS as a treatment and zero 
otherwise. 𝑌" is the potential outcome of indivi-
dual i,	𝑌&"	is the potential outcome of individual i 
when the individual receives BOS as the 
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treatment outcome or when 𝐷"	is equal to one. 𝑌*" is the potential outcome of individual i when 
the individual does not receive BOS as control 
outcome, or when 𝐷"	 is equal to zero. Thus, the 
treatment effect for an individual can be written 
as the following equation:  𝜏" = 𝑌&" 			− 𝑌*"																																														(2) 
The fundamental problem of causal infe-
rence/counterfactual problem makes it impossi-
ble to observe the potential outcome of indivi-
duals for both treatment (𝑌&"	) and control (𝑌*") 
conditions at the same time, so only one poten-
tial outcome for each individual can be 
observed, thus estimating the treatment effect of 
an individual is impossible.  
This paper estimates the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATET). ATET estimates 
the average among those who got the treatment 
or received BOS. ATET can be formulated as: 𝜏𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑌&" − 𝑌*"|𝐷" = 1]                   (3) 𝜏𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇 = 𝐸 𝜏 𝐷" = 1  														= 𝐸 𝑌&" 𝐷" = 1 − 𝐸 𝑌*" 𝐷" = 1 		(4)	𝐸 𝑌&" 𝐷" = 1  is the potential outcome of 
students who receive BOS (BOS students) and is 
potentially observable. 𝐸[𝑌*"|𝐷" = 1] is the 
potential outcome of BOS students when they 
did not receive BOS and cannot be observed 
because it is the missing counterfactual.  
To calculate ATET, it is essential to find a 
substitute for 𝐸(𝑌*"|𝐷" = 1). One possible way 
is by using the potential outcome of non-BOS 
students who do not receive treatment or BOS 𝐸(𝑌*"|𝐷" = 0) because the potential outcome 
from BOS students who did not receive 
treatment 𝐸 𝑌*" 𝐷" = 1  is not observed at the 
same time when those individuals received 
treatment. So, ATET can be estimated by using: 𝐸 𝑌&" 𝐷" = 1 − 𝐸 𝑌*" 𝐷" = 0 = 𝜏𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇  
                                   ...(5)      
Hence, ATET is estimated from the potential 
outcome of BOS students who receive treatment, 𝐸 𝑌&" 𝐷" = 1 , minus the potential outcome of 
non-BOS students who did not receive treat-
ment, 𝐸 𝑌*" 𝐷" = 0 .  
Assumptions and Five Steps of PSM 
In matching methods, there are assumptions 
to be applied in order to get a comparison group 
similar to the treatment group in observable 
characteristics (Sianesi, 2006): 
1. Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) 
The potential outcomes are independent of 
the treatment assignment based on the obser-
vable attributes of covariates X which are not 
influenced by treatment (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2005). Here, the observable differences in 
characteristics between the treated group or BOS 
students and non-treated group or non-BOS 
students should be controlled; the outcome that 
would result in the absence of treatment is the 
same in both cases. This identifying assumption 
for matching, which is also the identifying 
assumption for the simple regression estimator, 
is known as the Conditional Independence 
Assumption (CIA). 
2. Common Support 
Common support is the condition when there 
is a region of the support of matching variable 
that overlaps with the distribution of density 
scores from treated and untreated groups. The 
treated and untreated individual must have 
similar probabilities or treatment. As illustrated 
by figure 10, the region of common support is 
the range of the score which overlaps between 
density of scores for untreated individuals and 
density of scores for treated individuals.  
The data can be estimated by using the five 
steps of Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
Estimation. The five steps are as follows: 
1. Estimate the Propensity Score 
According to Caliendo and Kopeinig(2005), 
there are two steps to be conducted when 
estimating the propensity score: choice of model 
and choice of variables that should be included 
in the model. For the model choice, any discrete 
choice model can be used, such as Binary Logit, 
Binary Probit, Multinomial Logit, Conditional 
Logit and Multinomial Probit. The choice of 
model is not critical when the treatment is only 
binary, but when the model uses multiple 
treatment, some assumptions must be satisfied. 
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Moreover, for the choice of variables, the choice 
must be based principally on economic theory 
and previous empirical research findings.  
2. Choosing a Matching Algorithm  
There are a few different matching algo-
rithms. According to Caliendo and Kopeinig 
(2006), the matching algorithms are divided into 
five different groups: Nearest Neighbour(NN), 
Caliper and Radius, Stratification and Interval, 
Kernel and Local Linear and Weighting (see 
figure 11). 
This paper used Near Neighbour matching 
(NN). It estimates the average treatment effect 
on the treated using NN matching with replace-
ment and without replacement. NN with 
replacement is a matching method where one 
treated unit is matched to more than one non-
treated unit. It brings a trade-off between bias 
and variance. NN with replacement can yield 
better matches because controls that look similar 
to many treated units can be used multiple times, 
and the order in which the treated units are 
matched does not matter. In the case of NN 
without replacement, the ordering has to be done 
before estimating. 
3. Having Common Support 
Common support is a critical step in 
matching estimation. This depends on whether 
or not overlap occurs between treated and non-
treated groups. The common support condition 
ensures that matches for treated and untreated 
groups can be found.  
4. Assessing the Match Quality 
Tests must be conducted to assess the 
matching quality, such as test for standardised 
bias, test for equality of means before and after 
matching (t-test) and test of joint equality of 
means in the matched sample (F-test). If there is 
bad matching quality or there are still any 
differences, it is better to take a step back and 
redo the same steps until the matching quality is 
satisfactory. If after re-specification and re-
assessment the matching quality and the results 
are not satisfactory, it indicates that the Condi-
tional Independence Assumption fails to be met 
and alternative evaluation approaches should be 
used. 
5. Estimating the Standard Errors and 
Sensitivity Analysis. 
To deal with the problem of understated 
standard errors because of variation beyond the 
normal sampling variation when estimating, 
Lechner (2002) suggests using bootstrapped 
standard errors. Bootstrapped standard errors are 
used when the sampling distribution of para-
meter may not be of any standard distribution. 
Bootstrapped standard errors rely upon the 
assumption that the current sample is represen-
tative of the population. Besides that, sensitivity 
analysis should be applied to estimate the level 
of bias in observational studies (Guo and Fraser, 
2010). Based on Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
and Rosenbaum (2005), sensitivity analysis 
should be conducted routinely to see sensitivity 
of findings to hidden bias when the treated and 
untreated groups may differ in ways that have 
not been measured. Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test 
is one method of sensitivity analysis that was 
developed by Rosenbaum (2002). 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Following the Caliendo and Kopeinig 
(2005), the variables used in PSM should satisfy 
the Conditional Independence Assumption 
(CIA) where the outcome variables must be 
independent of the treatment conditional on the 
propensity score. Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 
(1997) suggest only including the variables 
which simultaneously influence the decision for 
receiving the school subsidy and the test score 
outcome. Matching on a large number of varia-
bles or on criterion variables gives to a dimen-
sionality problem. Propensity score matching is 
a solution to the dimensionality problem and can 
be estimated using any probability model, such 
as probit or logit model. Since most of the 
statistics literature prefers using the logit, this 
study also uses the logit model to get the 
prediction of propensity score, although any 
probability model can be applied (Dehejia & 
Wahba, 1998), and the results in the literature 
are typically robust to the method used. The 
probability of getting a school subsidy is deter-
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mined by various individual characteristics, e.g., 
gender, poor dummies, rank of province based 
on head count index, household expenditure on 
food, area, school administration and parental 
education background. Table 10 shows the 
results of the logit model. 
Looking at Column 1 of Table 10, most 
variables are significant at typical significance 
levels and only a few variables are not. The 
variables poor, urban, public school, rank of 
provincial HCI, the number of household 
members (hhsize) and household expenditures 
on food are significant. Those variables have the 
most influence on the probability of getting a 
school subsidy.  
1. Choosing Matching Algorithms 
This study uses Near Neighbour Matching, 
since the distribution of data is a little different 
in treated and untreated groups. As shown in 
Figure 12, the distribution of the treated group 
seems to have a higher propensity score than the 
untreated group which is what is supposed to 
happen.  
2. Checking the common support 
Following Sianesi (2006), the common 
support should be checked. The common support 
condition requires that there exists treated and 
non-treated units with similar values of the 
propensity score after matching. Figure 13 
confirms that the common support holds. There 
is an overlap propensity score between treated 
and control groups. 
3. Assessing the match quality 
In order to check the success of the matching 
for all independent variables, there are some 
tests to be done after matching. Caliendo and 
Kopeinig (2005) suggest assessing the quality of 
matching by using a standardised bias test, t-test 
for testing the equality of means before and after 
matching and an F-test for the joint equality of 
means in the matched sample.  
3.1. Test of standardised bias  
The standardised bias test is used to check 
the reduction of bias after matching. According 
to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), the stan-
dardised bias approach is calculated from the 
difference in means of the treated and untreated 
variables as a percentage of the square root of 
the average variance in both groups.  
Table 11 shows the standardised bias of 
variables before and after NN matching. We see 
8 out of 14 of the variables have less bias after 
matching than before matching, although 6 
variables have a higher bias after matching. 
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005) stated that there is 
no clear standard of success for bias reduction in 
matching methods.  
3.2. Test for equality of the mean before and 
after matching (t-test) 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) also suggested 
a t-test of the difference of covariate means for 
treated and control groups. Table 12 displays the 
p-value of the t-test for equality of the means 
before and after matching. Before matching, 
some of the covariate means are different 
between treated and control groups, but after 
matching only one (child test score) is signifi-
cantly different between groups. 
3.3. Test of Joint Equality of Means in the 
Matched Sample (Hotelling Test) 
After testing the difference of covariate 
means individually, a joint test for equality of 
means in all covariates can be conducted. Using 
the Hotelling test in Stata, the result shows that 
the P value of the F test is greater than 5 percent, 
which is 0.36. It indicates that the null of joint 
equality of means is not rejected, so the 
conditioning variables are well balanced jointly.  
RESULTS 
Having checked the quality of matching is 
satisfactory, it is then possible to estimate the 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
(ATET) because the control group now has 
similar characteristics to the treated group. Table 
14 shows the effect of school subsidy on student 
performance. The results indicate that there is a 
statistically significant impact of school subsidy 
on test score at 5 percent significant level for NN 
matching with replacement and without replace-
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ment. For individuals in the treatment group, the 
treatment has raised the test score by 0.26 points 
on average for NN matching with replacement, 
and by 0.28 points on average for NN without 
replacement. To check that the results are robust, 
this study carried out a number of additional 
estimation experiments with different matching 
estimators. In particular, it has tested calliper 
matching and also kernel matching. Table 14 
shows the various results from several types of 
matching methods and the estimated treatment 
effects are very similar to those obtained from 
NN with replacement and without replacement. 
EVALUATION: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS  
According to Rosenbaum (2002), selection 
bias occurs when two individuals with the same 
observed covariates have a different probability 
of receiving treatment. To deal with selection or 
hidden bias, Rosenbaum suggested that sensi-
tivity analysis be conducted using Wilcoxon’s 
signed rank test to get Rosenbaum bounds. Table 
15 shows the results of this sensitivity analysis 
for the study of the effect of the school subsidy 
on students’ tests scores using Wilcoxon’s 
signed rank test. The point estimation of 
Rosenbaum’s bounds of this study for the p-
values with Γ=1 is very close to the estimation in 
the propensity score matching analysis. The 
estimation effect of NN matching is 0.26 and the 
Hodges-Lehman point estimate is 0.269 and both 
results are significant at 5 percent. 
Table 15 also shows that for a small increase 
of Γ=0.2, p value increases to 0.099 in the upper 
bound, which is above the threshold of p value 
0.05. In this case, a hidden bias or selection bias 
of size Γ=1.2 is sufficient to explain the 
observed difference in test scores between the 
treatment group and the control group. Hence 
two units that appear similar and have the same 
covariates could differ in their odds of receiving 
the treatment by as much as a factor of 1.2. 
Because 1.2 is a small value, it shows that this 
study is sensitive to hidden bias. For Hodges-
Lehman point estimate interpretation, for 
example when Γ=1.1, matched students might 
differ in their test scores by a factor of 1.1 due to 
hidden bias. The range is between 0.206 and 
0.332.  
CONCLUSIONS 
This research indicates that poorer students 
have lower average test scores. This finding 
suggests that the Government of Indonesia needs 
to develop a subsidy program to provide a basic 
level of education for all students, especially for 
the poor. The recent school subsidy program is 
only sufficient for school fees or even only 
enough for tuition fees if the students live in 
urban areas. The remainder of the education 
expenditures must be covered by the household. 
That is why there are still some children of 
school age who cannot afford even basic 
schooling. This finding suggests that the amount 
of school subsidy should be adjusted and 
recalculated based on total education expen-
diture including transportation costs, living 
costs, book costs, and uniform costs. 
Another important finding is that parental 
education background is positively related to test 
scores. Moreover, estimation using PSM 
suggested that the BOS program has a positive 
and significant effect on child test scores. 
Students who receive subsidies attain higher test 
scores. It suggested that the BOS program in 
Indonesia increased test scores by 0.26 points or 
21.3percent of standard deviation. Overall, the 
early version of the program, BOS successfully 
improved student test scores performance. As a 
school subsidy policy, BOS is good at helping 
poor students to get access to education, 
especially basic education, since the government 
can ensure the use of subsidy for schooling, as 
the funding goes to the school directly and is 
managed by the teachers and monitored by the 
school committee. 
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Table 1. The Effect of School Subsidies in Various Countries 
Study Country Marginal effect Prop of SD Dependent variable 
Dearden and Heath (1999) Australia 0.038 7.70% enrolment rate 
Dearden et al. (2005) UK 0.045 7.20% dropout rate 
Schultz (2004) Mexico       
 Female 0.0092 4% enrolment rate 
 Male 0.008 3% enrolment rate 
Schady and Araujo (2004) Ecuador 0.032 7.60% enrolment rate 
Afridi (2010) India       
 Girls 1st grade  1.768 5.50% enrolment rate 
Kim, Alderman and Orazem (1999) Pakistan 0.33 68% enrolment rate 
Glewwe and Olinto (2004) Honduras 0.02 2.20% enrolment rate 
Maluccio and Flores (2005) Nicaragua 0.128 19.39% enrolment rate 
Sparrow (2007) Indonesia 0.008 2.60% enrolment rate 
Duflo (2001) Indonesia 0.03 17.60% dropout rate 
This study (2012) Indonesia 0.26 21.3% test score 
Note: SD=Standard Deviation 
 
Table 2. The Amount of School Subsidies 
No Program Year Unit 
Nominal value 
(Rupiah) 
Real value (Rupiah) 
(2007=100) 
Primary 
School 
Junior High 
School 
Primary 
School 
Junior High 
School 
1 JPS Scholarship* 1998-2003 per poor student 
per annum 
120,000 240,000 240,712 481,424 
 JPS Block grant 1998-2003 per school per 
month 
2,000,000 4,000,000 4,011,867 8,023,735 
2 BKM Scholarship* 2001-2004 per poor student 
per annum 
120,000 240,000 191,748 383,496 
 BKM Block Grant 2001-2004 per school per 
semester 
40,000,000 50,000,000 63,916,148 79,895,185 
3 BOS** 2005-2009 per poor student 
per annum 
235,000 325,000 260,443 360,187 
  2009-now per student for 
all students per 
annum 
400,000 575,000 341,792 490,472 
Note:*Given directly to the student, **given to schools on the basis of the number of students 
         1 USD=RP 14,000; Source: SMERU (2006) 
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Table 3. BOS Participation Rate 
Primary School Grade 
Percentage of student 
Number of students 
Non BOS BOS 
1 85.51 14.49 856 
2 81.89 18.11 795 
3 84.07 15.93 703 
4 83.46 16.54 665 
5 85.03 14.97 715 
6 87.02 12.98 131 
Junior High School Grade 
 
 
1 87.35 12.65 490 
2 85.25 14.75 400 
3 85.02 14.98 227 
Source: calculated from IFLS 4 
 
 
Table 4. The Percentage of Poor BOS Students in Selected Samples 
Province Total number of Students 
Poor students  Poor students with BOS 
Number % of total students  Number 
% of total 
students 
% of total poor 
students 
East Java 2957 1002 33.9 
 
242 8.2 24.2 
North Sulawesi 3173 - - 
 
296 9.3 - 
North Sumatra 2841 940 33.1 
 
256 9 33.1 
West Nusa Tenggara 1740 568 32.6 
 
111 6.4 32.6 
Source: SMERU 2006 
 
Table 5. Proportion of Students by Village Decision Maker 
  
Proportion of students with: 
poor letter BOS  
no BOS 
# % 
 
# % 
head of village 1,000 506 51  494 49 
staff of village 596 365 61  231 39 
Other 348 142 41  206 59 
Total 1,944 1,013 52  931 48 
Source: calculated from IFLS data 
 
Table 6. Students’ Test Score in 2007 
  BOS Non-BOS 
Mean 6.56 6.50 
SD 1.36 1.25 
Observation 276 6320 
Source: calculated from IFLS data 
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Table 7. Distribution of Students’ Test Score by Parental Education Background (%) 
The highest level of 
parental education 
Father education   Mother education 
Average test score % 
 
Average test score % 
No schooling 6.26 4.76 
 
6.24 7.97 
Primary school 6.40 48.93 
 
6.40 54.78 
Junior high school 6.46 15.47 
 
6.53 16.24 
Senior high school 6.66 22.12 
 
6.85 16.05 
College D1, D2, D3 6.96 2.90 
 
7.02 2.63 
Bachelor’s 7.03 5.45 
 
7.06 2.22 
Master’s 7.26 0.33 
 
7.70 0.11 
Doctorate 8.35 0.03    
Observation 
 
6405    6528 
Source: calculated from IFLS data 
 
 
Table 8. The Average Costs to Individuals of School Spending (Rupiah) 
per annum in 2007 
  Variable Rural Urban 
Registration fees 58,250 234,369 
Tuition fees 83,800 317,748 
Exam fees 16,833 40,262 
Book costs 66,687 134,050 
Uniform costs 62,942 112,433 
Transportation costs (A) 134,215 282,019 
Housing costs and food (B) 299,338 560,758 
Additional course costs (C) 20,803 96,588 
Total 742,868 1,778,227 
Total – (A+B+C) 288,512 838,862 
Source: calculated from IFLS4; Note: 1 USD= 14,000 Rp 
 
 
Table 9. Parental Education  
The highest level of 
parental education 
Father 
 
Mother 
BOS 
(%) 
Non-BOS 
(%) 
 
BOS 
(%) 
Non-BOS 
(%) 
No schooling 3.26 4.15  5.28 6.98 
Primary school 46.59 40.12  51.10 43.54 
Junior high school 15.77 17.14  19.42 19.11 
Senior high school 23.60 26.90  18.13 22.12 
College D1, D2, D3 2.75 3.46  2.19 3.31 
Bachelor’s 7.93 7.44  3.88 4.65 
Master’s 0.10 0.72  0.00 0.28 
Doctorate 0.00 0.07  0.00 0.00 
Source: calculated from IFLS data 
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Table 10. BOS Logit Model 
 Dependent Variable: BOS 
Parameter estimates 
Coefficient 
(1) 
SE 
(2) 
Poor 0.730** 0.288 
Male 0.098 0.066 
Urban 0.119* 0.070 
Rank of provincial HCI  -0.046*** 0.006 
HH size 0.049*** 0.018 
Log of HH expend on food -0.162** 0.062 
Father secondary 0.262*** 0.090 
Father higher education 0.582*** 0.158 
Mother secondary 0.120 0.101 
Mother higher education 0.321 0.206 
Public school 2.300*** 0.077 
Head of Village 0.301*** 0.071 
Staff of Village 0.293*** 0.077 
Java -0.191*** 0.068 
Constant -3.333*** 0.895 
Observation   
Note: dependent variable is BOS where 1 is for recipient and 0 otherwise 
*Significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%  
 
Table 11. Standardised Bias from NN Matching  
  Before Matching 
After 
Matching 
Child test score 30.1 24.7 
Poor 4.6 -6.5 
Male -9.3 -7.9 
Urban -12.2 -9.0 
Rank of provincial HCI  -4.5 5.6 
HH size 8.3 5.1 
Log of HH expend on food -5.0 0.7 
Father secondary -14.3 2.9 
Father higher education 16.7 4.5 
Mother secondary -0.2 -1.6 
Mother higher education 0.5 -7.7 
Public school -7.8 -1.1 
Staff of Village 1.2 -8.5 
Java -18.1 -20.3 
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Table 12. Test for Equality of The Mean Before and After Matching (t test) 
  
P value of t test 
Before matching NN with replacement 
Child test score 0.000 0.024 
Poor 0.566 0.548 
Male 0.228 0.459 
Urban 0.112 0.397 
Rank of provincial HCI  0.540 0.598 
HH size 0.320 0.615 
Log of HH expend on food 0.522 0.947 
Father secondary 0.076 0.772 
Father higher education 0.012 0.695 
Mother secondary 0.978 0.884 
Mother higher education 0.948 0.476 
Public school 0.309 0.915 
Staff of Village 0.880 0.439 
Java 0.019 0.056 
 
 
Table 13. Hotelling Test After Matching 
 Mean for BOS=1 Mean for BOS=0 
Child test score 6.84 6.56 
Poor 2.46 2.55 
Male 0.47 0.50 
Urban 0.46 0.51 
Rank of provincial HCI 10.22 9.89 
HH size 5.30 5.25 
Log of HH expend on food 13.84 13.82 
Father secondary 0.16 0.15 
Father higher education 0.08 0.07 
Mother secondary 0.15 0.15 
Mother higher education 0.02 0.02 
Public school 0.42 0.43 
Staff of Village 0.20 0.24 
Java 0.43 0.53 
Hotelling p-value, that means 
are different for two groups - 0.36 
Observation 178 3105 
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Table 14. The Effect of School Subsidy on Student Performance 
Matching method Effect SE BS SE P-value 
NN with replacement 0.265 0.118 0.129 0.040 
NN without replacement 0.281 0.116 0.126 0.036 
Kernel 0.313 0.081 0.084 0.000 
Radius Caliper 0.312 0.082 0.076 0.000 
Note: SE(Standard Error of estimator); BS SE(Bootstraped clustered standard error) 
 
Table 15. The Rosenbaum Sensitivity Analysis 
Γ 
p-value of Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test  Hodges-Lehman point estimate 
Upper bound Lower bound  Upper bound Lower bound 
1 0.010 0.010 
 
0.269 0.269 
1.1 0.037 0.002 
 
0.206 0.332 
1.2 0.099 0.000 
 
0.153 0.391 
1.3 0.203 0.000 
 
0.102 0.439 
1.4 0.341 0.000 
 
0.050 0.492 
1.5 0.493 0.000 
 
0.002 0.540 
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Source of data: Central Bureau of Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistics, BPS) 
Figure 1. Net Enrolment Rate on Each Level of Schooling from 2000 to 2009 
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 Source of data: Central Bureau Statistics of Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistics, BPS) 
Figure 2. The Number of Schools for Primary and Junior High School Levels 
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Source of data: Central Bureau Statistics of Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistics, BPS)  
Figure 3. The Number of Primary and Junior High School Students  
 
 
Source: Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia 
 
Figure 4. Ratio of BOS Students to Total Number of Children at Primary School Age in 2010 by 
Region 
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Figure 5. Proportion of Students with BOS by Village Decision Maker 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Proportion of Father’s Education Background from BOS Students  
by Village Decision Maker 
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Figure 7. Proportion of Gender from BOS Students by Village Decision Maker 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Proportion of Urban/Rural from BOS Students by Village Decision Maker 
Figure 9. Test Scores Distribution 
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Figure 10. Common Support Region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Caliendo and Kopeining (2006) 
Figure 11. Different Matching Methods 
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Figure 12. The comparison of propensity score distribution before matching 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Propensity score distribution and common support 
for propensity score estimation 
 
	
